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Summary 
Although a global cap-and-trade system is seen by many researchers as the most cost-
efficient solution to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, developing countries governments 
refuse to enter into such a system in the short term. Hence, many scholars and 
stakeholders, including the European Commission, have proposed various types of 
commitments for developing countries that appear less stringent, such as sectoral 
approaches. In this paper, we assess such a sectoral approach for developing countries. 
More precisely, we simulate two policy scenarios in which developed countries continue 
with Kyoto-type absolute commitments, whereas developing countries adopt an emission 
trading system limited to electricity generation and linked to developed countries' cap-and-
trade system. In a first scenario, CO2 allowances are auctioned by the government, which 
distributes the auctions receipts lump-sum to households. In a second scenario, the auction 
receipts are used to reduce taxes on, or to give subsidies to, electricity generation.  Our 
quantitative analysis, led with a hybrid general equilibrium model, shows that such options 
provide almost as much emission reductions as a global cap-and-trade system. Moreover, 
in the second sectoral scenario, GDP losses in developing countries are much lower than 
with a global cap-and-trade system and so is the impact on the electricity price. 
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Sectoral targets for developing countries: 
Combining "Common but differentiated responsibilities" 









Although a global cap-and-trade system is seen by many researchers as the most cost-efficient 
solution to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, developing countries governments refuse to 
enter into such a system in the short term. Hence, many scholars and stakeholders, including 
the European Commission, have proposed various types of commitments for developing 
countries that appear less stringent, such as sectoral approaches.  
In this paper, we assess such a sectoral approach for developing countries. More precisely, we 
simulate two policy scenarios in which developed countries continue with Kyoto-type 
absolute commitments, whereas developing countries adopt an emission trading system 
limited to electricity generation and linked to developed countries' cap-and-trade system. In a 
first scenario, CO2 allowances are auctioned by the government, which distributes the 
auctions receipts lump-sum to households. In a second scenario, the auction receipts are used 
to reduce taxes on, or to give subsidies to, electricity generation.  
Our quantitative analysis, lead with a hybrid general equilibrium model, shows that such 
options provide almost as much emission reductions as a global cap-and-trade system. 
Moreover, in the second sectoral scenario, GDP losses in developing countries are much 
lower than with a global cap-and-trade system and so is the impact on the electricity price. 
Keywords 
Sectoral approach, sectoral target
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Although a global cap-and-trade system
1 is seen by many researchers as the most cost-
efficient solution to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, developing countries governments 
refuse to enter into such a system in the short term, i.e. in 2013, when the first commitment 
period of the Kyoto Protocol ends. An option to make developing countries participate could 
be to grant them a generous allowance allocation, so that they could benefit from participating 
in the global cap-and-trade system by selling allowances (cf. e.g. Tirole, 2009). However, as 
we shall see in section 1, this proposal is unlikely to be sufficient to convince developing 
countries. Moreover it may be refused by developed countries as well since it would imply a 
massive North-South financial transfer, partly to buy "tropical hot air" (Philibert, 2000).  
Hence, many scholars and stakeholders have proposed various types of commitments for 
developing countries that appear less stringent than the participation in a global cap-and-trade 
system, such as commitments limited to some sectors. IEA (2009c) as well as Meckling and 
Chung (2009) provide surveys of these sectoral approaches. Most recently, the European 
Commission (2009) proposed a "sectoral crediting mechanism" in the run-up to Copenhagen. 
Surprisingly, very little quantification of these proposals exists. Amatayakul et al. (2008), 
Amatayakul and Fenhann (2009),  as well as Schmidt et al. (2008) assess the amount of 
emissions that could be reduced through sectoral targets in the main developing countries, but 
do not assess the economic impact.  
In this paper, we assess such a sectoral approach for developing countries. More precisely, we 
simulate two policy scenarios in which developed countries continue with Kyoto-type 
absolute commitments, whereas developing countries adopt an emission trading system 
limited to electricity generation and linked to developed countries cap-and-trade system. We 
choose the electricity sector for three reasons. First, electricity and heat generation is by far 
the highest emitting sector: 41% of CO2 emissions from fuel combustion in 2007, increasing 
by 60% since 1990 (IEA, 2009a). Second, there will be a massive investment in electricity 
generation in the next decades: the last World Energy Outlook (IEA, 2009b) projects a growth 
in electricity demand by 76% from 2007 to 2030, requiring 4 800 GW of capacity additions. 
Avoiding an irreversible investment in CO2-intensive capacity, the so-called “carbon lock-in”, 
is thus of the utmost importance (IEA, 2009c). Third, this sector has a relatively high 
abatement potential and implementing emission trading is easier there than in sectors with 
more diffuse sources such as transportation, residential or agriculture.  
In one of our two sectoral scenarios, CO2 allowances are auctioned by the government, which 
distributes the auctions receipts lump-sum to households. In the other, the receipts are rebated 
                                                 
1 Or a uniform global tax, which would be equivalent to a global cap and trade system under the assumptions 
used in the present paper, i.e. no uncertainty (cf. Weitzman, 1974) and no market power on the CO2 market (cf. 
Hahn, 1984). Version submitted – 23 December 2009 
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to electricity generation firms as a decrease in pre-existing taxes or a subsidy
2.The economic 
impact of the latter approach is equivalent to that of an intensity target, which limits the 
CO2/MWh ratio, not CO2 emissions themselves. Both approaches figure in the European 
Commission sectoral crediting mechanism proposal mentioned above. For a survey of the 
implications of intensity vs. absolute targets, cf. Quirion (2009). 
As we shall see, these scenarios entail a decrease in developing countries CO2 emissions 
almost as high as a global cap-and-trade system, for a given abatement level in developed 
countries and a similar CO2 price. At the same time, these scenarios may be more acceptable 
by developing countries governments than a global cap-and-trade system, especially the 
second one with rebates. Firstly, they are more in line with the principle of "Common but 
differentiated responsibilities". Secondly, as we shall see, this last scenario entails a much 
lower increase in the electricity price, thereby limiting the distributional consequences and 
increasing the acceptability of the climate policy. 
To assess these policy scenarios, we use Imaclim-R, a global multi-region, multi-sector 
general equilibrium model designed to assess CO2 emissions scenarios and policies. Imaclim-
R is a hybrid model of a second-best world economy: it represents in a consistent framework 
the macro-economic and technical world evolutions, taking into account second-best features 
such as possible underutilization of production factors (labour and capital) and imperfect 
anticipations. The model is fully detailed in Sassi et al. (2010) and tested against real data in 
Guivarch et al. (2009). 
The structure of the article is straightforward. Part 1 details the reasons why a worldwide 
emission caps scheme is unlikely. The scenarios are described in part 2, the results presented 
in part 3 and a fourth part concludes. Appendix 1 provides a description of the Imaclim-R 
model and Appendix 2 the results concerning the world energy prices. 
 
1. Why a global emission cap is unlikely, but abatement in 
developing countries necessary 
At least four factors explain why developing countries governments are reluctant to 
participate in a global cap-and-trade system.  
Firstly, the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities", laid down in article 4 of 
the UNFCCC, implies that developed countries should implement abatement policies and 
measures sooner than developing countries. Imposing the same nature of obligations in 
developed and developing countries may thus be seen as a violation of this principle. 
Admittedly, it can be defended that a global cap-and-trade system with more stringent targets 
                                                 
2 Since a single sector is covered, reducing taxes on labour or on production yields the same result so far as we 
make the simplifying assumption that the labour/output ratio is the same across electricity production 
technologies. Otherwise, reducing taxes on labour would increase the share of labour-intensive options. If 
several sectors were covered, a uniform reduction in labour taxes would again favour labour-intensive sectors.  Version submitted – 23 December 2009 
 4 
in developed than in developing countries fits with this principle, but the opposite view seems 
prevalent in developing countries. 
Secondly, absolute emissions caps are often viewed as a constraint to economic growth and to 
the right to (sustainable) development, which is also acknowledged by the UNFCCC in its 
article 3. Certainly, this reasoning is doubtful since it neglects both the possibility to decouple 
emissions from economic growth and the access to the global carbon market. Yet, here again, 
this view is widespread among developing countries governments. 
Thirdly, a global cap-and-trade system is the most cost-efficient solution only if the global 
CO2 price is not limited to inter-governmental emission trading, but is decentralised in the 
form of an emissions tax or of a domestic emission trading system in all countries. Although 
cost-effective, such policies would have large distributional consequences in developing 
countries and the increases in the energy costs caused by the CO2 price may well trigger 
strong political protests. 
Fourthly, some analysts (e.g. Strand, 2009) underline the “revenue management” issues in 
case of a large transfer of emissions allowances, including the so-called “Dutch disease”, i.e. 
the decrease in industry competitiveness entailed by the real exchange rate appreciation 
caused by the transfer. 
For all these reasons, the prospect of a global cap-and-trade system is extremely unlikely at 
least in the short run. Indeed, one can fear that developing countries participation in a global 
climate agreement – in the event of such an agreement – will be very weak. In most proposals 
currently on the negotiating table (WRI, 2009a), including the recent Copenhagen Accord 
(UNFCCC, 2009), this participation takes the form of a list of mitigation actions, that is a list 
of heterogeneous policy measures whose additionality would be difficult or even impossible 
to assess, and which would be far from cost efficiency.  
Moreover, in spite of the recent political changes in the United States, and as we could see 
during the Copenhagen negotiations, the US administration and Senate still insist on a 
meaningful participation of major developing economies. Indeed, without a rapid 
decarbonisation of the major developing countries, limiting global warming to 2°C over the 
pre-industrial level is out of reach: in 2005, non-Annex I parties Greenhouse gas emissions 
(including the six Kyoto gases, international bunkers and emissions from land-use change and 
forestry) amounted to 56% of the global total and this share is increasing (WRI, 2009b).  
 
2. Scenarios 
We simulate five scenarios, among which the first three are benchmarks to which the latter 
two can be compared. We deliberately chose to simulate very simple architectures: the aim is 
indeed to shed light on the economic mechanisms and not to assess fully realistic designs. Version submitted – 23 December 2009 
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In every scenario but the business-as-usual one, Annex I countries
3 as a whole have the same 
emissions, and the scenarios differ by the climate policy implemented (or not) in developing 
countries. Note that the international CO2 price resulting from these policies is almost equal 
across scenarios (cf. Figure 14 in Appendix 2). Hence, had we compared scenarios for a given 
CO2 price rather than for a given emissions level in Annex I, we would have had similar 
results. 
BAU. This is a business-as-usual scenario, i.e. without any climate policy. Since our focus is 
on comparing the scenarios rather than on forecasting emissions, in this scenario as well as in 
the others, we neglect the climate policies that have been or will be implemented before 2013. 
CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion increase from 24 Gt in 2001 to 33 in 2013 and 37 
in 2030. 
Global_Cap. A global cap-and-trade system is implemented from 2013 on. A trajectory of 
CO2 emissions caps is prescribed from 2013 on in order to limit the CO2 concentration at 450 
ppm (excluding emissions from land-use, land-use change and forestry). Emissions peak at 34 
Gt in 2015 and then decrease to 25 Gt in 2030. This global emission cap is split among the 
regions according to a "contraction-and-convergence" approach, with a convergence of per 
capita allowances in 2100 and a linear progression towards this target from 2013 to 2100. The 
regions then trade allowances with each other at a single world CO2 price. This inter-region 
cap-and-trade system is decentralised through domestic emission trading systems covering all 
CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion, so that every emission source pays the same CO2 
price in every sector and in every region.  
All allowances are auctioned, but the use of receipts differs across sectors. In all productive 
sectors except electricity generation, auction receipts are distributed to firms as a decrease in 
the pre-existing production taxes, or (when the auction receipt are higher than the amount of 
the production tax) as a subsidy. Auction receipts of the allowances which cover emissions 
from households and electricity producers are distributed to households as a lump-sum. This 
hybrid way of using the auctions revenue is consistent with the functioning of the European 
Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) from 2013 on: electricity generation will have to 
buy allowances at auctions and the receipts will go to the general public budget, while the 
large majority of other sources will receive allowances free of charge. For industry, the 
quantity of allowances an installation receives under the EU ETS is roughly proportional to its 
production capacity (Ellerman, 2006). Over the long run, the production level and the 
production capacity are almost proportional, so this way of allocating allowances is roughly 
equivalent to a subsidy on production. 
                                                 
3 Throughout the text, we use the terms "Annex I countries" and "developed countries" indifferently, as well as 
"Non-Annex I countries" and "developing countries". 
 Version submitted – 23 December 2009 
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Annex_I_Only. Annex I countries have the same emissions as in the Global_Cap scenario 
and also trade allowances with each other. The difference is that no climate policy is 
implemented in developing countries. 
Elec_Households. Annex I countries have the same emissions as in the Global_Cap and 
Annex_I_Only scenarios and also trade allowances with each other. Developing countries 
implement an emission trading system limited to electricity generation, linked to developed 
countries cap-and-trade system. We set the amount of allowances allocated in each 
developing country electricity sector so that it equals its ex post emissions at the CO2 price 
defined by the Annex I CO2 market. In other words, developing countries are neither sellers 
nor buyers on the global CO2 market
4. This sectoral target is decentralised through a domestic 
emission trading system, with domestic allowances auctioned by developing countries 
governments, who distribute the auctions revenues as a lump-sum to households.  
Elec_Rebates. The only difference with the previous scenario is that in developing countries, 
auction receipts are distributed to electricity generation firms as a decrease of the pre-existing 
production tax or as a production subsidy. 
 
3. Results 
3.1. CO2 emissions: the sectoral approaches provide almost as 
much abatement as the global cap-and-trade system 
Obviously, the global emission trajectory is the highest in the BAU scenario and the lowest in 
Global_Cap (Figure 1). In the Annex_I_Only scenario, the emission trajectory is closer to 
BAU than to Global_Cap, for two reasons. First, imposing a cap on Annex I emissions only 
deals with around half of the issue, since in our BAU scenario these countries emit 50% of the 
emissions cumulated over 2013-2030. Second, a part of the abatement in developed countries 
"leaks" to developing countries, as is apparent in Figure 3 below. This leakage is very limited: 
the leakage-to-reduction ratio is only 8% in 2030. It comes mainly through two mechanisms. 
First, the world prices of oil, coal and natural gas are reduced by CO2 abatement measures in 
developed countries (cf. Figure 11-13 in Appendix 2), thereby increasing emissions in 
developing countries. Second, the competitiveness of the energy-intensive industries of 
developed countries is reduced by the climate policy, leading to a loss in market shares to the 
benefit of developing countries producers, whose emissions increase. 
                                                 
4 Admittedly, in the sectoral crediting mechanism proposed by the European Commission (2009) and in most 
other proposals, the crediting target would be set at a higher level than expected emissions, so that developing 
countries would benefit from a transfer of CO2 allowances from developed countries. We did not include such 
transfers in order to disentangle the impact of transfers from the other economic mechanisms. Version submitted – 23 December 2009 
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The most interesting point in Figure 1 is that in the two sectoral scenarios, emissions are much 
closer to Global_Cap than to Annex_I_Only. Indeed in 2030, global abatement compared to 
the BAU scenario reaches 32% in Global_Cap, 26% under the two sectoral scenarios and only 
13% under Annex_I_Only. In other words, in 2030, both sectoral scenarios reach 80% of the 
abatement (compared to BAU) of Global_Cap. Two factors explain this positive result. First, 
electricity generation is the main emitting sector in the BAU scenario, with 41% of emissions 
in 2030. Second, this sector benefits from relatively cheap abatement possibilities, especially 
compared with transportation. In this regard, Imaclim-R converges with the 19 models 
compared by Clapp et al. (2009). 
 Version submitted – 23 December 2009 
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Figure 4 focuses on emissions from electricity generation in non-Annex I countries. In both 
sectoral scenarios, emissions are close to Global_Cap but a little higher. In Global_Cap, 
electricity consumption is reduced since the overall economic activity is more impacted by the 
climate policy (cf. Figure 6 below). Emissions are slightly higher in Elec_Rebates than in 
Elec_Households. Indeed, in the former scenario, the rebate partially offsets the price 
increase, hence electricity generation is less impacted and the decrease in emissions is lower. 
 Version submitted – 23 December 2009 
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In Elec_Households and, to a much lesser extent, in Elec_Rebates, emissions from the 
energy-intensive industry in developing countries actually increase compared to BAU (cf. 
Figure 5). This is because the rise in electricity price (cf. section 3.3 below) induces industry 
to substitute fossil fuels for electricity. In other words, there is an inter-sectoral emission 
leakage, which explains why, in 2030, aggregate non-Annex I emissions are a little lower in 
Elec_Rebates than in Elec_Households (Figure 3) although non-Annex I emissions from 
power generation remain higher in Elec_Rebates than in Elec_Households over all the 
simulation period.  
As shown in Figure 5, in Annex_I_Only, emissions from the energy-intensive industry in 
non-Annex I countries are a little higher than in BAU, because developing countries CO2-
intensive industries win market shares vis-à-vis developed countries, generating a small 
amount of carbon leakage. 
 Version submitted – 23 December 2009 
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3.2. GDP losses: The sectoral approach with rebates entails much 
lower GDP losses in developing countries 
As is apparent from Figure 6, the transitory GDP losses in developing countries are 
significant: they reach more than 3% (compared to BAU) around 2018. After that, GDP 
progressively catches up with its BAU level. This partial catch-up is due to induced 
technological change mechanisms (Crassous et al., 2006) and less vulnerability to peak oil. 
The economies vulnerability to peak oil in baseline scenarios is due to the imperfect 
expectation of oil price increase when producers are constraint by depletion of resources. This 
imperfect expectation is partially corrected by carbon pricing: technical change and 
consumption structure change induced by climate policies reduce economies dependence on 
oil. Nevertheless the prospect of such short term losses would be difficult to accept for 
developing countries governments. In Elec_Households, the losses are lower but still reach 
2% around 2018. Note that in this scenario, GDP is actually higher than in BAU after 2029, 
mainly because developing countries benefit from lower world energy prices. In 
Elec_Rebates, GDP losses are always less than 1% and GDP is higher than BAU as soon as 
2020.  
From Figures 3 and 6, we can see that in the late 2020s, Elec_Rebates provides a similar 
emissions reduction than Elec_Households for a much lower impact on GDP in developing 
countries. This result may surprise since in a simple model without pre-existing distortion and 
without leakage, using the auction or tax receipts as a production subsidy increases the 
abatement cost, for a given abatement target (e.g. Fischer, 2001), compared to a lump-sum 
distribution of the receipts. The explanation is that in our setting, a lump-sum distribution of 
the receipts exacerbates the pre-existing distortions and generates inter-sectoral emissions Version submitted – 23 December 2009 
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leakage (from electricity generation to industry) more than a distribution of the receipts as a 
decrease in pre-existing production taxes or as a production subsidy. 
Finally, in the Annex_I_Only scenario, developing countries GDP increases compared to 
BAU for two reasons: they win some market shares in CO2-intensive goods vis-à-vis Annex I 
regions and they benefit from lower world energy prices. 
GDP losses in China follow the same trends, but with higher magnitudes (Figure 7), because 
of its high CO2-intensity: 0.6 kg CO2/US$ PPP in 2007 vs. 0.47 for the world average and 
0.48 for non-Annex I countries in average (IEA, 2009a). 
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The picture differs for Annex I countries whose GDP is always lower than in BAU (cf. Figure 
8). The loss is the lowest in Global_Cap because in the other scenarios, Annex I loses market 
shares. Moreover, world energy prices are the lowest under Global_Cap. The highest losses 
occur in the Annex_I_Only and Elec_Rebates scenarios, with very close values, whereas 
losses are intermediate for Elec_Households. The explanation of this last result is that under 
that scenario, developed countries lose less market shares because developing countries 
producers suffer from a higher electricity price than in Annex_I_Only and Elec_Rebates.  
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3.3. Impacts on electricity markets are much milder with rebates 
As shown in Figure 9, under Global_Cap and Elec_Households, electricity price
5 almost 
doubles in China both compared to BAU and to the historical level. The main reason for this 
increase is that electricity producers pass the cost of allowances on to consumers, and a less 
important factor is that more expensive production technologies partly replace the relatively 
cheap fossil fuel technologies.  
In Elec_Rebates, the electricity price increases much less: the price increase due to the CO2 
allowances is partially offset by the subsidy. More surprising is the fact that electricity price 
actually drops below the BAU level after 2020. There are two explanations. First, some 
learning-by-doing occurs in low carbon technologies, which are more used in the scenarios 
with climate policies. Second, in Imaclim-R, electricity producers set their price according to 
the complete cost of electricity generation over the life time of their power plants, using the 
current fossil fuel prices as the expectation of the future prices. However, in the BAU scenario 
we simulate, gas and oil prices do increase (cf. Figure 11 and 12 in Appendix 2), thus the 
electricity generation mix in BAU is too carbon-intensive compared to the ex post private 
optimum. A CO2 price helps to correct this myopia by pushing producers to reduce the share 
of fossil fuel in their generation mix. 
Electricity production (Figure 10) mirrors electricity price. In Global_Cap and 
Elec_Households, electricity generation is roughly stabilised in China, whereas its growth 
follows the BAU level in the Annex_I_Only and Elec_Rebates scenarios. 
The same trends occur in other regions except Brazil, which benefits from a large share of 
hydropower. 
 
                                                 
5 The electricity price shown here is the production price, i.e., including production taxes and subsidies (if any), 
averaged over time slices. It is not the final consumption price which differs across sectors and includes 
consumption taxes and subsidies. Version submitted – 23 December 2009 
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Many scholars and stakeholders have proposed sectoral targets for developing countries. We 
provide an economic assessment of such proposals using Imaclim-R, a global multi-region, 
multi-sector general equilibrium model designed to assess CO2 emissions scenarios and 
policies. More precisely, we assess scenarios in which developed countries apply Kyoto-type 
targets whereas in developing countries, emissions in electricity generation are subject to the 
same CO2 price as emissions in developed countries.  Version submitted – 23 December 2009 
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The results indicate that a sectoral target for developing countries limited to the electricity 
sector is able to provide around 80% of the global emission reductions of a global cap-and-
trade system, for a given Annex I abatement. Moreover, if this sectoral target is implemented 
as an emission trading system or as an emissions tax with receipts distributed to electricity 
generation firms as a decrease in pre-existing production taxes or as a production subsidy, the 
economic impact in developing countries is milder than that of a global cap-and-trade system: 
GDP losses are much lower and so is the impact on the electricity price. 
The scenarios assessed here are intentionally very stylized. In the real world, if a sectoral 
approach is applied, it will certainly feature a higher level of differentiation across regions, 
including inter alia a staged implementation with entry dates depending on development 
levels, price differentiation and international transfers. 
In the longer term, the share of emissions from other sectors, especially transportation, will 
grow in developing countries as they did in developed countries. Moreover, with economic 
growth, the high emitters in the developing world will have a higher ability to join a global 
cap-and-trade system. Consequently, the sectoral approach we presented here should be seen 
as a transitory device rather than as an alternative to a more global approach. Version submitted – 23 December 2009 
 16 
Appendix 1. The Imaclim-R model 
Imaclim-R is a hybrid recursive general equilibrium model of the world economy, divided 
into 12 regions and 12 sectors (Table 1) and solved in a yearly time step (Sassi et al. 2009). 
The base year of the model (2001) is built on the GTAP-6 database, which provides a 
balanced Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) of the world economy. The original GTAP-6 
dataset has been modified to (i) aggregate regions and sectors according to the Imaclim-R 
mapping, and (ii) accommodate the 2001 IEA energy balances, in an effort to base Imaclim-R 
on a set of hybrid energy-economy matrixes. Note that the emission trajectory simulated in 
the business-as-usual scenario from 2002 to 2007 is very close to the IEA CO2 emissions data 
(IEA, 2009): according to the IEA, CO2 world emissions from fossil fuel combustion grew 
from 23.7 Gt CO2 in 2001 to 29.0 in 2007, whereas the output of the Imaclim-R model is 29.1 
Gt CO2 for 2007. 
Table 1. Regional and sectoral disaggregation of the Imaclim-R model 




OECD Pacific (JP, AU, NZ, KR) 






Rest of Asia 












Composite (services and light industry) 
 
As a general equilibrium model, Imaclim-R provides a consistent macroeconomic framework 
to assess the energy-economy relationship through the clearing of commodity markets. 
Specific efforts have been devoted to building a modelling architecture allowing easy 
incorporation of technological information coming from bottom-up models and experts’ 
judgement within the simulated economic trajectories. The rigorous incorporation of 
information about how final demand and technical systems are transformed by economic 
incentives is allowed by the existence of physical variables that explicitly characterise 
equipments and technologies (e.g. the efficiency of cars, the intensity of production in 
transport, etc.). The economy is then described in both money-metric terms and physical 
quantities, the two dimensions being linked by a price vector. This dual vision of the economy 
is a precondition to guaranteeing that the projected economy is supported by a realistic 
technical background and, conversely, that any projected technical system corresponds to 
realistic economic flows and consistent sets of relative prices.  
The full potential of this dual representation could not be exploited without abandoning the 
use of conventional aggregate production functions that, after Berndt and Wood (1975) and Version submitted – 23 December 2009 
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Jorgenson (1981), were admitted to mimic the set of available techniques and thus the 
technical constraints impinging on an economy: it is arguably almost impossible to find 
mathematical functions flexible enough to cover large departures from the reference 
equilibrium and to encompass different scenarios of structural changes resulting from the 
interplay between consumption styles, technologies and localisation patterns (Hourcade 
1993). In Imaclim-R the absence of formal production functions is compensated by a 
recursive structure that allows a systematic exchange of information between:  
•  An annual static equilibrium module with Leontief production functions (fixed 
equipment stocks and intensities of intermediary inputs, especially labour and energy; 
but a flexible utilisation rate). Solving this equilibrium at some year t provides a 
snapshot of the economy: information about relative prices, output levels, physical 
flows and profit rates for each sector and allocation of investments among sectors. 
•  Dynamic modules, including demography, capital dynamics and sector-specific 
reduced forms of technology-rich models, most of which assess the reactions of 
technical systems to the previous static equilibriums. These reactions are then sent 
back to the static module in the form of updated input-output coefficients to calculate 
year (t+1) equilibrium. 
Between two equilibriums, technical choices are fully flexible for new capital only; the input-
output coefficients and labour productivity are modified at the margin, because of fixed 
techniques embodied in existing equipment and resulting from past technical choices. This 
general putty-clay assumption is critical to representing the inertia in technical systems and 
the perverse effect of volatility in economic signals. 
Imaclim-R thus generates economic trajectories by solving successive yearly static 
equilibriums of the economy interlinked by dynamic modules. Within the static equilibrium, 
in each region, the demand for each good derives from household consumption, government 
consumption, investment and intermediate uses from the production sectors. This demand can 
be provided either by domestic production or imports and all goods and services are traded on 
world markets. Domestic and international markets for all goods – excluding labour – are 
cleared by a unique set of relative prices that depend on the demand and supply behaviours of 
representative agents. The calculation of this equilibrium determines relative prices, wages, 
labour, quantities of goods and services, and value flows.  
The dynamic modules shape the accumulation of capital and its technical content; they are 
driven by economic signals (such as prices or sectoral profitability) that emerge from former 
static equilibriums. They include the modelling of (i) the evolution of capital and energy 
equipment stock described in both vintage and physical units (such as number of cars, housing 
square meter, transportation infrastructure), (ii) of technological choices of economic agent 
described as discrete choices in explicit technology portfolios for key sectors such as 
electricity, transportation and alternative liquid fuels, or captured through reduced form of 
technology rich bottom up models, and (iii) of endogenous technical change for energy 
technologies (with learning curves). Version submitted – 23 December 2009 
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In this framework, the main exogenous drivers of economic growth are population and labour 
productivity dynamics. However, international trade, particularly that of energy commodities, 
and imperfect markets for both labour (wage curve) and capital (constrained capital flows, 
varying utilisation rates of productive capacities), significantly impact on economic growth.  
 Version submitted – 23 December 2009 
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Appendix 2. Impact on world energy and CO2 prices 
The world prices of oil, natural gas and coal are endogenous and result from demand 
dynamic, availability of substitutes and depletion of resources (cf. Waisman et al., 2010, for a 
presentation of this part of the model). 
As shown in Figure 11, the world energy prices are the highest in BAU and the lowest in 
Global_Cap. More generally, the higher the emissions, the higher the energy prices, because 
the implicit supply curve of fossil fuels is upward-slopping. 
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As we can see in Figure 14, the CO2 price is almost equal across all scenarios but a little 
higher in Global_Cap.  The explanation is that in this scenario, the fossil fuel prices are lower, 
so a higher CO2 price is required to reach a given emissions level in Annex I countries. 
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